Warrantless searches and weakened autonomy of NABU and SAPO: What changes after President Zelenskyi signed Draft Law No. 12414?

On July 22, the Verkhovna Rada adopted Draft Law No. 12414, which amends the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (CPC) and several other laws. Despite the officially declared goal — to improve the investigation of disappearances during martial law — the actual content of the law is much broader and contains provisions that raise serious professional concerns. At the same time, it does include some positive developments.

A negative signal

The most alarming aspect is the unprecedented concentration of powers in the hands of the Prosecutor General. The law grants the Prosecutor General the exclusive authority to:

• approve motions to extend the duration of pre-trial investigations;

• resolve jurisdictional disputes between NABU and the Economic Security Bureau (ESB);

• unilaterally assign prosecutors to criminal proceedings, including transferring cases from NABU to other investigative bodies;

• conclude plea agreements in corruption-related criminal offenses without the participation of SAPO prosecutors.

As a result, the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) effectively loses its autonomy and becomes a structural unit of the Prosecutor General’s Office without an independent procedural role. This not only undermines the independence of anti-corruption investigations but also calls into question the effectiveness of Ukraine’s anti-corruption architecture, which was built over years with international support.

A positive aspect

One positive element is the attempt to regulate the long-standing problem of so-called urgent (warrantless) searches. Businesses and human rights advocates have repeatedly emphasized that searches without prior court authorization have become systemic, going far beyond the legally intended exceptions.

Based on the content of Draft Law No. 12414, it appears the authors attempted to limit warrantless searches to criminal proceedings where life or health are at risk.

The law amends Part 3 of Article 233 of the CPC, stating:

“An investigator, inquiry officer, or prosecutor shall have the right to enter a person’s home or other property without a court order only in urgent cases related to saving lives, preventing immediate threats to health, sexual freedom or personal safety, or in cases of hot pursuit of persons suspected of crimes under Articles 112, 115–119, 121, 122, 124, 127, 129, 135, 136, 146, 147, 149, 152–156¹, 258, 258¹, 259 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, or in cases where it is necessary to urgently seize or preserve evidence related to such crimes.”

However, the implementation of this provision is legally flawed. It remains unclear why lawmakers selectively chose only certain articles of the Criminal Code to allow such warrantless searches. The list does not include all offenses that involve threats to life or health.

For example, inexplicably excluded from the list are:

• Article 348 — attempt on the life of a law enforcement officer;

• Article 348-1 — attempt on the life of a journalist;

• and others with clearly high-risk implications.

In addition, the wording of this provision contradicts Article 30 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which explicitly and exhaustively defines the grounds for entering a person’s home. These constitutional grounds cannot be expanded by procedural legislation without amending the Constitution. Since constitutional norms have direct effect, law enforcement must continue to follow them as the primary legal framework.

Moreover, the law introduces a basis for warrantless searches — “urgent seizure or preservation of evidence” — that goes beyond what the Constitution allows. The Constitution only permits such entry in cases aimed at saving property, which is not necessarily synonymous with “evidence.” As such, the law violates principles of legal drafting and interpretive clarity.

In other words, although the problem is acknowledged, it remains legally unresolved. Nevertheless, the legislative attempt to recognize and address the issue can be seen as a step in the right direction.

What about the expanded personnel powers of the Prosecutor General?

Another notable provision is the expansion of the Prosecutor General’s authority to appoint prosecutors without a competitive selection process during martial law.

On one hand, this follows the general trend of centralized, manual control of the prosecution system. On the other, it may have practical merit in wartime, as the prosecutor’s office currently faces a significant staffing shortage, while competitive procedures can take years to complete.

In such circumstances, quick appointments may prove more effective than lengthy formal processes.

The true effectiveness of these changes, however, can only be assessed over time — based on their practical implementation.

Key questions remain:

• Can SAPO remain an effective player in the anti-corruption system when key levers are beyond its control?

• Are we sliding back toward manual control of justice under the guise of reform and wartime adaptation?

• If Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions no longer retain autonomy — do they truly exist in substance?