President Signs Law No. 4555-IX: Centralization for Efficiency or a Step Back for Anti-Corruption Independence?

The President of Ukraine has signed Law No. 4555-IX, which amends the Criminal Procedure Code and several other laws—formally to improve investigations into missing persons during wartime. However, the key consequence of this decision lies not only in addressing a humanitarian issue but in significantly reshaping the criminal prosecution system in Ukraine.

In his public statement, the President emphasized that these amendments are “intended to enhance the state’s ability to respond to wartime challenges and ensure effective investigation of serious crimes, particularly those against civilians.”

Nevertheless, the adoption of the Law has raised considerable concern among Ukraine’s legal community, civil society, and international partners, including the European Union. Criticism has primarily focused on provisions that expand the powers of the Prosecutor General and limit the autonomy of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO).

What does this Law mean, and what are its implications?

The Law grants the Prosecutor General significantly broader powers. These include:

• the exclusive authority to determine which law enforcement agency will carry out pre-trial investigations—even in cases traditionally handled by NABU;

• the right to approve extensions of pre-trial investigations up to 12 months;

• the ability to sign plea agreements in corruption-related cases without the involvement of SAPO prosecutors;

• the exclusive power to issue notices of suspicion to a widened category of special subjects. Previously, this was limited to top officials; now, only the Prosecutor General may issue such a notice even to a deputy minister.

In effect, these changes dismantle SAPO’s procedural independence and shift the balance of criminal justice by concentrating key decisions in the hands of a single official—the Prosecutor General. The consequences for the independence of investigations and for international trust may be serious.

What does the loss of SAPO’s independence mean for business?

For the business community, the loss of SAPO’s independence is not an abstract threat, but a direct weakening of legal safeguards. Since its inception, SAPO has served as an institutional safeguard against abuse in cases involving public or political pressure.

Stripping SAPO of its independence increases legal uncertainty: decisions to initiate or pursue proceedings may be made not based on professional assessment, but under administrative direction from the Prosecutor General. Whether that happens will depend on how the Prosecutor General chooses to wield these powers.

Without SAPO’s procedural autonomy, the anti-corruption vertical (NABU–SAPO–HACC) loses its balance with other law enforcement bodies. This means cases that should be investigated by NABU and tried in the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) may be redirected, stalled, or diluted. As a result, businesses may find themselves facing not a predictable legal process, but a situational one shaped by external influence or pressure.

Particularly concerning is the signal this sends to international partners and investors: that Ukraine may be rolling back reforms. It erodes trust in the justice system, increases investment risks, and portrays the country as one where criminal justice tools may be misused for pressure, not fairness.

What about “urgent searches”?

For business, the new law sends a mixed message. On the one hand, it includes provisions long demanded by the business community—an attempt to regulate so-called “urgent” searches, where law enforcement conducts searches without a judge’s order citing urgent necessity.

On paper, it appears lawmakers have responded to the concerns of businesses and human rights defenders and aim to narrow the scope for abuse. The revised part 3 of Article 233 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides:

“An investigator, inquirer, or prosecutor may, prior to a judge’s order, enter a dwelling or other property only in urgent cases […] or in direct pursuit of individuals suspected of committing crimes under Articles 112, 115–119, 121, 122, 124, 127, 129, 135, 136, 146, 147, 149, 152–156-1, 258, 258-1, 259 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, or in cases of urgent seizure or preservation of evidence related to such crimes.”

The intent seems sound—to limit the situations where such searches are permissible and clearly define them. However, the legal implementation is flawed.

Firstly, it’s unclear why lawmakers selectively included certain articles in the list. Not all crimes involving threats to life or health are mentioned. For instance, they omitted:

• Article 348 – attempted murder of a law enforcement officer;

• Article 348-1 – attempted murder of a journalist;

• and other similar offenses clearly warranting urgent intervention.

Secondly, the list lacks clear logic. Some articles relate to serious crimes like murder or terrorism, but others—such as threats of murder or endangerment—raise doubts about whether they truly justify warrantless searches. This opens the door to arbitrary interpretation and legal uncertainty.

Moreover, the provision contradicts Article 30 of Ukraine’s Constitution, which sets exhaustive grounds for entering a home without a court order. A procedural law cannot override constitutional norms—making this change legally vulnerable.

In the end, instead of offering real protection against abuse, the law introduces a formal rule that not only fails to solve the problem but creates the illusion that it has been solved.

How will this affect the fight against corruption?

SAPO and NABU were created as independent institutions to ensure a genuine—not simulated—fight against high-level corruption. If the Prosecutor General can now assume key powers such as transferring cases or assigning prosecutors, that fight may be severely undermined.

The anti-corruption system risks turning from an independent vertical into a managed division, where decisions are made not on professional merit but administrative convenience. This would damage not only public trust in justice but also Ukraine’s international reputation. The real impact, however, will become clear only with time.

What does this mean for Ukraine’s path to the EU?

The European Union has repeatedly stressed: the independence of NABU and SAPO is a condition for Ukraine’s continued European integration. Weakening these institutions, even formally, will be seen as a step back in judicial reform.

We may see:

• worsened assessments in annual EU progress reports;

• suspension of some financial aid;

• a slowdown in membership negotiations.

Why such focus on NABU and SAPO’s “independence”?

Because independence was the core reason these institutions were created.

NABU and SAPO were designed as a separate anti-corruption vertical—beyond the reach of the Prosecutor General’s Office and political elites. Their institutional model was developed with input from the EU, IMF, World Bank, and other international partners. They were not just enforcement tools but symbols of a new standard of governance.

Key conditions included:

• independent recruitment through transparent competitions;

• exclusive jurisdiction protected by law;

• procedural autonomy eliminating “manual” interference.

These institutions were created under international pressure in response to chronic impunity for top officials and political shielding of corruption schemes—and in response to Ukrainians’ post-Maidan demand for real justice.

That’s why any move to limit SAPO’s powers or dilute NABU’s independence sparks intense reaction—at home and abroad. It’s not just about the effectiveness of specific investigations, but about the credibility of the entire anti-corruption architecture and the political will to fulfill Ukraine’s commitments.

In wartime, when Western support is crucial, undermining NABU and SAPO’s independence sends the wrong political signal—a signal that could come at a high cost.

What is the impact on HACC?

This Law does not directly affect the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC). However, HACC cannot function effectively without high-quality investigations and sound prosecution. Without independent and professional input from SAPO and NABU, the court’s mission may be compromised.