Special Tribunal for Putin: Between Nuremberg and The Hague

President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy has signed documents for the ratification of the Agreement on the Establishment of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine. Just a day earlier, on June 26, Ukraine signed this Agreement with the Council of Europe in Strasbourg.

But how does this new tribunal differ from the International Criminal Court in The Hague? And most importantly — will it actually bring us closer to holding the perpetrators accountable?

Why a Special Tribunal?

The Agreement establishing the Special Tribunal is a response by the international community to the current lack of an effective mechanism for prosecuting the crime of aggression. According to Article 1 of its Statute, the Tribunal has the authority to investigate, prosecute, and try individuals who bear the greatest responsibility for the aggression against Ukraine — namely, the top political and military leadership of the Russian Federation who made the decision to invade.

This is what international law defines as a “leadership crime” — the planning, preparation, initiation, or execution of an act of aggression by someone who had effective control over a state’s political or military actions. Aggression is recognized in international law as one of the four core international crimes, alongside genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

Why Not the International Criminal Court?

While the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) does list the crime of aggression, the ICC faces legal limitations in exercising jurisdiction over such cases. When the Rome Statute entered into force in 2002, there was no consensus on the definition of aggression. It wasn’t until the Kampala Conference in 2010 that the crime was formally defined and a mechanism for its activation agreed upon. However, these amendments only came into force in 2018.

Even then, the ICC’s jurisdiction over aggression applies only to states that have both ratified the Rome Statute and accepted the Kampala amendments — which excludes the Russian Federation.

Ukraine became a party to the Rome Statute on January 1, 2025. However, even before that, it had recognized the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court ad hoc through prior declarations concerning war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. This ad hoc recognition does not extend to the crime of aggression. As a result, the ICC cannot prosecute the Russian leadership for initiating the war.

The Special Tribunal has therefore been established to fill this legal gap. It will have jurisdiction over crimes of aggression committed on the territory of Ukraine and will be empowered to hold those responsible for initiating the war to account.

How Will the Tribunal Work Alongside Other International Courts?

The Special Tribunal is not intended to replace the International Criminal Court but rather to complement it. While the ICC continues its investigations into war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity in Ukraine, the Special Tribunal will focus solely on the crime of aggression.

Both institutions are expected to operate from The Hague and are anticipated to cooperate closely. The creation of the Tribunal is a pragmatic step to address jurisdictional gaps in the current international legal system concerning accountability for the act of war itself.

What About Immunities? Will the Guilty Be Prosecuted?

The Statute of the Special Tribunal clearly states that no individual, including sitting heads of state, heads of government, or foreign ministers (the so-called “troika”), is immune from prosecution for the crime of aggression.

However, the Statute also notes that prosecution is only possible if such individuals lose their official positions or voluntarily waive their immunity — a clause that presents obvious legal and practical challenges, including arrest, extradition, and enforcement of verdicts.

Still, international law has seen similar precedents. From Nuremberg to the tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, history shows that no position guarantees impunity forever.

Is This a Victory?

Today, the Russian Federation faces accountability through international sanctions, political isolation, and proceedings in courts such as the European Court of Human Rights. However, criminal prosecution for aggression represents a different level of justice — one that targets the decision-making behind the war and establishes personal responsibility.